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PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW
THE REIGNOF ERROR:PSYCHIATRY,
AUTHORITY,
AND LAW. By Lee
Coleman, M.D. Boston, Beacon Press 1984. 300 Pp., $18.95.
Reviewed by Linda C. Fentiman

*

The Reign of Error is psychiatrist Lee Coleman's indictment of
the abuses of psychiatry, both ancient and modern. Coleman canvasses
a variety of topics in the area of psychiatry and the law, including
the insanity defense, diminished capacity, competency to stand trial,
involuntary civil commitment and treatment of the mentally ill, indeterminate sentencing of criminals, and the juvenile justice system.
Coleman's book, published in 1984, is a highly readable but seriously
flawed effort to address the misuses of psychiatry and its employment
by the state as an instrument of social control.
The Reign of Error suffers from two major defects. First, and
most significantly, the book is written ten years too late, and describes
a mental health system that, to a large extent, no longer exists. In
an innovative twist on the "I've got some good news and some bad
news" routine, Coleman merely gives us old news: the widely accepted
view that psychiatry has sometimes been used as an agency of state
power' to remove deviant people from the community, and that many
serious violations of liberty and personal integrity have been accomplished in the guise of "benevolent" medical treatment of the
mentally ill.* From a legal standpoint, the book is particularly deficient, in that Coleman's apparently limited awareness of significant
judicial decisions subsequent to the mid-1970's leaves the reader with
an erroneous view of present law, which has in some respects significantly improved the treatment of the mentally ill in America.
The book's second major weakness is that it is highly anecdotal
and impressionistic, with little hard data to back up its emphatic
conclusions. For example, in support of his argument that psychiatrists
Assistant Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School: B.S. Cornell University
1970, J.D. State University of New York at Buffalo Law School 1975, L.L.M. Harvard
University Law School 1983.
1 . See P. STARR,THE SOCIALTRANSFORMATION
OF AMERICAN
MEDICINEI5 (1982) "The
search for legitimation by other agencies in society often promotes dependence upon the
cultural authority of medicine. In this regard, medical authority is a resource for social order
as well as for the profession and its clients."
2. See A. BROOKS,LAW, PSYCHIATRY
AND THE MENTALHEALTHSYSTEM
(1974); N. KITTRIE, THE RIGHTTO BE DIFFERENT
(1971); H . MORRIS.ON GUILTAND INNOCENCE 38-39 (1976);
A. STONE,MENTALHEALTHAND LAW:A SYSTEMIN TRANSITION
(1976); T. S u s z . PSYCH~ATRIC
SLAVERY(1 977).
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often make serious diagnostic and treatment errors, Coleman presents
a chronicle of abuses which encompasses in its litany of horrors the
eighteenth century practice of bleeding by Benjamin Rush, "the father
of American psychiatry," the widespread performance of lobotomies
in United States mental hospitals during the 1940's and 1950's, and
the participation of noted psychiatrists in CIA-funded experiments
with mind-altering drugs during the 1950's and 1960's. While these
atrocity stories make good copy, they are hardly reflective of the
state of American psychiatry today. Further, Coleman's emphasis
on past wrongs has limited his ability to offer constructive solutions
to the new generation of psychiatric problems presented in the 1980's.
These weaknesses permeate The Reign of Error. While it is not
possible to present all of Coleman's errors here, a detailed discussion
of one of the book's sections-that addressing the treatment and
mistreatment of the institutionalized mentally ill-will serve as a
paradigm for the failure of Coleman's analysis throughout the book,
and will exemplify the limited and outdated case law and data on
which he relies.
In addressing the issue of involuntary commitment and treatment
of the mentally ill, Coleman makes several valid points: that psychiatrists often "overdiagnose" mental illness; that they sometimes
institutionalize people not because such commitment is necessary for
the patient's physical safety or the safety of others, but because it
is convenient for their family or neighborq3 and that such unwarranted
institutionalization is effectively a form of preventive detention, a
systematic deprivation of liberty which is visited upon no other group
in America today.4 Coleman also notes the substantial body of research literature which indicates that psychiatrists are simply unable
to predict, with any kind of accuracy, whether the individuals they
examine will be "dangerous" to themselves or others in the future,
and he .therefore argues that they should not be allowed to make
such predictions in a court of law. ' ~ n i s ,indeed, was the position
of the American Psychiatric Association in an amicus curiae brief
submitted to the Supreme Court in Barefoot v. E ~ t e l l e ,a~ case in
which the Supreme Court upheld the use of psychiatric testimony
concerning the likelihood that a convicted murderer would commit acts
of violence in the future, as bearing on the question of whether the
3. This "convenience function" of the mental health system has been described by Brooks,
Stone, and others. See sources cited supra note 2.
4. Dershowitz, Psychiatry in the Legal Process: A Knife That Cuts Both Ways, in A.
SUTHERLAND,
THE PATHOF THE LAW FROM1967, at 71-83 (1968).
5 . 103 S. Ct. 3383, 3408-09 (1983).
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death penalty ought to be imposed. However, in discussing the dangerousness issue, Coleman fails to mention recent research which,
while su~portingthe general proposition that psychiatrists are inaccurate predictors of future dangerousness, also suggests that in
certain narrowly circumscribed clinical settings, a psychiatrist can
predict the likelihood of future violent actiom6 It is this sort of
one-sided presentation of the evidence which permeates the book and
undercuts the persuasiveness of its analysis.
Coleman's explication of the other problems of the "civilly" mentally ill is also inadequate. The major foci of his discussion are
psychiatry's past abuses in treating the mentally ill, the overuse of
psychotropic medication in the treatment of mental illness, and the
role of fiscal conservativism in achieving the deinstitutionalization
of much of the nation's mentally ill population. Here again, Coleman
paints a misleading and outdated picture of the legal position of the
mentally ill in America today.
Characteristically, Coleman begins his attack with a long history
of past psychiatric abuses (lobotomies and electroconvulsive therapy
figure prominently here). Having thus set up the reader to be distrustful of psychiatric hegemony, he warns that, "These lessons from
the past may be useful should we decide to question the authority
of today's psychiatrist to have the final say.""
Coleman next discusses the long-recognized fact that psychotropic
medication is often prescribed unnecessarily and, even when its use
is medically appropriate, in excessive dosages. Here, Coleman does
well to point out that these drugs are often used for the convenience
of the staff, to make difficult patients easier to control, and that
in some institutions, medication is used in lieu of psychotherapy, rather
than as an adjunct to it. Coleman also describes in great detail the very
serious side effects of psychotropic medication. These painful and
often permanently disabling side effects, such as tardive dyskinesia,
are particularly likely to occur when, as was often the case in the
past, the drugs are prescribed in enormous doses for extended periods
of time, without careful patient monitoring. Coleman's account of
psychotropic drugs reads however, as if they serve no useful purpose
whatsoever and were, indeed, invented solely as instruments of individual torture and social control. In fact, psychotropic medication
is in many cases a necessary predicate to successful psychotherapy,
and it is psychotropic medication which has made it possible for a
6. J. Monahan, Prediction Research and the Emergency Commitment of Dangerous Mentally Ill Persons: A Reconsideration, 135 Am. J . Psychiatry 198 (1 978).
7. L. COLEMAN,
THE REION OF ERROR 111 (1984).
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large number of mentally ill individuals to live productively and
safely in the community.
Coleman's analysis of the committed mentally ill gives only brief
attention to the wave of "right to refuse treatment" suits brought
~ fails to
by institutionalized mental patients in the late 1 9 7 0 ' ~ ,and
discuss the results of this litigation. He omits any analysis of the
differing judicial approaches to the right to treatment and to refuse
treatment, including the "right to a second psychiatric opinion"
remedy of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Rennie v. Klei~z,~
and the vague and complex "substituted judgment" standards of the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Rogers v. Okin.'O
More importantly, Coleman fails to acknowledge that an increasing number of thoughtful commentators have suggested that the real
concern of most institutionalized mentally ill is not the ability to refuse
treatment but their inability to get meaningful psychiatric treatment
in the first place. Since it is only a tiny fraction of all mental patients who are asserting a right to refuse treatment," a far more effective remedy for all patients would be the court-ordered provision of
adequate psychiatric services for a11.12 To declare, as Coleman does,
that a mental patient has an absolute right to refuse treatment under
all circumstance^^^ may propel the psychiatrist even more clearly into
the role of police agent. As explained by Alan Stone, "The refusal
of treatment makes the confinement of the dangerous mentally ill
nothing but preventive detention. . . . Confinement without treatment makes the hospital into a prison and transforms the psychiatric
staff into correctional officers. "l 4 Surely this result is the antithesis
of the individual autonomy which Coleman so fervently seeks.
8. See, e.g., Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1371 (D. Mass. 1979) (patients may
refuse nonemergency administration of psychotropic drugs); Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp.
1131, 1147 (D. N.J. 1978) (patients have right to second opinion).
9. 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981).
10. 390 Mass. 489, 458 N.E.2d 308 (1983).
11. Professor Alexander Brooks has estimated, for example, that in New Jersey, no more
than five percent of all state mental patients have ever asserted a right to refuse medication.
UNIVERSITY
OF MIAMISCHOOL
OF LAW CONFERENCE
ON MENTALHEALTHLAW: DEVELOPMENTS
IN THE 1980's (February 24-25, 1984).
12. This, of course, is not without considerable practical and legal difficulties. Lottman,
Enforcement of Judicial Decrees: Now Comes the Hard Part, 1 MENTALDISABILITY
L. RPTR.
69 (1976); see also Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 104 S. Ct. 900, 921 (1984)
(barring federal court jurisdiction over challenges to state action based on state law).
13. "[A]II mental patients [should] be presumed competent to refuse any treatment. Refusal
should never be overturned by a doctor or a court." L. COLEMAN,THEREIGNOF ERROR192
(1984) (emphasis in original).
14. Stone, The Right to Refuse Treatment: Why Psychiatrisis Should and Can Make it
Work, 38 .ARCH.GEN. PSYCHIATRY
358, 361 (1981).
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Perhaps most significantly, Coleman fails to address the problems
of today's mentally ill. Although there are no longer huge numbers
of mentally ill individuals languishing in the back wards of giant
state institution^,'^ there are still a significant number of persons in
state and local mental health facilities, some of whom are not receiving
adequate psychiatric treatment, which is the only legitimate justification for their involuntary presence there.I6 In addition, there are
a great number of homeless mentally ill individuals, victims of the
deinstitutionalization movement of the 1960's and 197OYs,seemingly
forgotten by Coleman, who are arguably in need of psychiatric treatment but who do not meet the more stringent civil commitment
criteria enacted within the past decade. This phenomenon of deinstitutionalization was caused by the convergence of a number of
factors. In part, it was the result of a series of landmark legal
victories securing for mental patients significantly increased procedural
due process piotection,17 narrower criteria for ~ o m r n i t r n e n t ,and,
~~
in many jurisdictions, a right to receive such psychiatric treatment
as gives the patients a meaningful opportunity to be cured or to
improve their mental condition."19 None of these fundamental changes
in the treatment accorded the mentally ill are mentioned by Coleman,
perhaps because they do not fit within his paradigm of psychiatry
as an instrument of state oppression. But without reference to the
revolutionary change in both the substantive and procedural aspects

15. Between 1955 and 1983, the nationwide population of patients at state mental hospitals
ASSOCIATION,
TASKFORCEREPORT
dropped from 559,000 to 132.000. AMERICANPSYCHIATRIC
ON THE HOMELESS
MENTALLY
ILL 62 (H.R. Lamb ed. 1984).
16. Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451, 455 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F.
Supp. 373, 377 (M.D. Ala. 1972). The significance of these favorable lower court decisions has
been somewhat undercut by the Supreme Court's decision in O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422
U.S. 563 (1975). There the Supreme Court specifically refused to decide the question of whether
a person civilly committed as mentally ill had a constitutional right to treatment. Id. at 573.
Instead, the Court held only that the continued confinement, and thus deprivation of liberty,
of a person who is not dangerous and who could survive in society with the help of others
was a violation of the right to liberty guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 576.
For an intriguing analysis of the Court's decision-making process in the Donuldson case, see
B. WOODWARD
& S. ARMSTRONG,
THE BRETHREN:INSIDETHE SUPREMECOURT,at 369-89
(1979).
17. See Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 p m i m (E.D. Wis. 1972) (holding civil
commitment procedures constitutionally defective).
18. See MASS. GEN. LAWSANN. ch. 123 $5 1, 7-8; N.Y. MENTALHYG. LAW $5 91.37,
91.39 (McKinney 1985).
19. The deinstitutionalization movement also gained momentum due to the financial ince$tives offered state governments by changes in federal funding for the mentally ill and other
disabled individuals. However, to argue, as Coleman does, that deinstitutionalization was
supported solely for financial reasons is both inaccurate and disingenuous.
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of civil commitment of the mentally ill over the last two decades,
the reader is left with a misleading picture of the current status of
the institutionalized and noninstitutionalized mentally ill. For example, Coleman announces that "in a civil commitment trial, proof
of accusations [regarding the necessity of commitment] need only
be shown by a 'preponderance of evidence.' "20 Since the Supreme
Court's 1979 decision in Addington v. T e ~ a s , however,
~'
the standard
of proof for civil commitment has been the more rigorous "clear
and convincing evidence" standard. Coleman's failure to mention
this significant ruling, as well as the decisions of a number of state
courts which have insisted upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt
as a prerequisite for civil ~ o m m i t r n e n t ,suggest
~~
at the very least a
selective marshalling of the facts, and at most a willful disregard
for the truth.
In sum, The Reign of Error is simplistic, polemical, and based
on inadequate and outmoded data. The subtitle on the book's dust
jacket makes clear both the thrust of Coleman's argument and also
its ultimate weakness. The subtitle proclaims the book to be "A
startling expose of psychiatry's misrule in the courts, mental hospitals,
and prisons." "Startling" and "expose" seem to be the guiding
principles of Coleman's endeavor. What is missing in his "National
Enquirer" approach to the relationship between psychiatry and state
power is an analysis which recognizes the complexity of the problems
that confront our society in dealing with the mentally ill today.
Coleman speaks in moral absolutes, using black and white labels,
when what is demanded is a thoughtful and reasoned exploration
of the difficult issues raised when psychiatric expertise is brought
to bear on the question of individual freedom and responsibility in
the criminal and civil law.

20. L. COLEMAN,
THE REIGNOF ERROR108 (1984).
21. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
22. See Superintendent of Worcester State Hosp. v. Hagberg, 374 Mass. 271, 275-76, 372
N.E.2d 242, 245 (1978).

Heinonline - - 19 Sufflok U. L. Rev. 780 1985

